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“If a Person Must Die, Then So Be It”:  
A Constitutional Perspective on South Africa’s Land 
Crisis  
   
Dylan Hitchcock-Lopez * 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A stark, green line separates manicured rows of grapevines from the 
sprawling warren of shacks and shanties that makes up Kayamandi 
township, just miles from the urban heart of Cape Town.1 The township 
strains under the pressure of rapid population growth, with more than 
7,000 dwellings cramming into some of the most crowded blocks in South 
Africa.2 Above the township, Louiesenhof winery sits like a colonial 
redoubt atop the pristine acres of rolling vineyard it has occupied since 
1701.3 
In May 2018, Kayamandi boiled over. Black South Africans from the 
township pushed up the hill to erect shacks on the winery’s land in an 
effort to claim it as their own.4 Community members squared off with 
those sent to evict them, weathering tear gas, pepper-spray, and jail.5 
Though eventually rebuffed, they returned just a few months later even 
more determined to claim a piece of precious soil.6 As one community 
 
*. J.D. 2019. This Note was born out of research which began while the author was one of 
Washington University School of Law’s Global Public Interest Law Fellows working at the Legal 
Resources Centre in Durban, South Africa during Summer/Winter 2017. It would not have been 
possible without the perspective, insight, and guidance of the dedicated attorneys at the LRC, who 
continue to struggle for land reform and legal development in South Africa. Special thanks to Sharita 
Samuel, Thabiso Mbhense, Ektaa Deochand, and Previn Vedan. Special thanks are also due to 
Professor Karen Tokarz at Washington University in St. Louis, whose dedication to the public interest 
has supported generations of Global Public Interest Fellows around the world. 
1. Selam Gebrekidan & Norimitsu Onishi, In South Africa’s Fabled Wine Country, White and 
Black Battle Over Land, THE NEW YORK TIMES (March 9, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/world/africa/stellenbosch-south-africa.html?smid=nytcore-ios-
share. For a powerful visual illustration, see Johnny Miller, Stellenbosch/Kayamandi, UNEQUAL 
SCENES, https://unequalscenes.com/stellenbosch-kayamandi (last visited April 11, 2019). 
2. Id. 
3.  LOUIESENHOF, http://www.louiesenhof.co.za/ (last visited April 11, 2019).  
4.  Gebrekidan & Onishi, supra note 2.  
5.  Id.  
6. Id.  
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leader put it, “[I]f a person must die, then so be it. Because we are not 
moving here. We will fight until we receive places to live in.”7 A year 
later, on the evening of Sunday June 2, 2019, four masked men entered the 
home of Stefan Smit and shot and killed him while he ate dinner.8 Smit 
was the owner of Louiesenhof winery.9 
Conflict arising from a gaping disparity in land ownership is not unique 
to Kayamandi and the Louisenhof winery. Roughly seventy percent of all 
individually owned farms are—like Louisenhof—in the hands of South 
Africa’s white minority which makes up just eight percent of the 
population.10 Like Kayamandi, much of South Africa is buckling under the 
pressure of inequality in land ownership, which is the product of a history 
of legal dispossession stretching back centuries. Recently, however, that 
scene has become increasingly tinged with violence. 
The government’s failure to implement promised land reforms11 
remains a pressing national issue and the lack of progress has inspired 
burgeoning resentment, threats, and violence.12 Julius Malema, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical 
political offshoot of the dominant African National Congress (ANC),13 
was famously charged in 2016 for inciting his supporters to seize land by 
 
7.  Jenna Etheridge, Stellenbosch Land Owner Heads to Court for Eviction Order, NEWS24 
(August 21, 2018) https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/stellenbosch-land-owner-heads-to-
court-for-eviction-order-20180821. 
8. Norimitsu Onishi and Kimon de Greef, South African Wine Farmer in Land Dispute is Shot 
Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/world/africa/south-africa-
wine-farmer-killed.html. 
9.  Id.  
10.  Gebrekidan & Onishi, supra note 2; Statistics South Africa, Community Survey 2016: Statistical 
Release, Table 2.2 (2016) http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-
RELEASE-for-CS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf. 
11.  See, e.g., 1994 National Election Manifesto, AFRICAN NAT’L CONGRESS, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160618165435/hhtt://www.anc.org.za/shsh.php?id=262 (last captured 
June 18, 2016) (“South Africa belongs to all who live in it. To make this a reality, an ANC 
government will . . . encourage large scale farming, and ensure security of tenure and all basic rights 
for farm workers…guarantee victims of forced removals restitution…use state land in the 
implementation of land reform.”). 
12. Shaazia Ebrahim, The Land Question Part 2: Why is Malema Bent on Getting the Land Back?, 
THE DAILY VOX (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/the-land-question-part-2-why-is-
malema-bent-on-getting-the-land-back-shaazia-ebrahim/. 
13. Julius Malema of South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighers—A Profile, BBC (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14718226. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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force.14 He later faced similar charges for implying violence against white 
landholders, telling a crowd of hundreds “[w]e are not calling for the 
slaughter of white people, at least for now. . ..”15 His message has slowly 
begun to gain traction with certain segments of the population, may of 
whom have lost patience with the glacial pace of formal reform. As the 
threat of armed struggle grows, the need for the government to take 
decisive and immediate action becomes ever clearer.16 
South Africa’s current land crisis is the direct consequence of 
apartheid—the policy of strict racial segregation established by the white-
ruled Nationalist Party in 195317—and of earlier colonial laws which 
conditioned property ownership along racial lines.18 After decades of 
political struggle the minority rule of the Nationalist Party was brought to 
an end in 1994 when Nelson Mandela became the first democratically 
elected president of South Africa.19 The transition marked the beginning of 
efforts to dismantle the legal apparatus that had sustained the apartheid 
state for half a century.20  
In May 1996, South Africa adopted its modern Constitution, which 
explicitly established the goal of reversing the systematic, racist 
 
14.  James Macharia, Malema Tells EFF Supporters to Seize White-Owned Land, Defying Court, 
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016), https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-14-malema-tells-eff-supporters-
to-seize-white-owned-land-defying-court. 
15.  Malema: “We Will Take Back the Land. By Any Means Necessary.”, SA PEOPLE NEWS (Nov. 7, 
2016), https://www.sapeople.com/2016/11/07/julius-malema-sings-kiss-the-boer-hints-white-
slaughter-land-back-south-africa/. See also Macharia, supra note 14. (“When we leave here and 
you see any beautiful piece of land and you like it, occupy it, it belongs to you . . . It is the land that 
was taken from us by white people by force through genocide”). 
16.  Since early drafts of this paper an emerging groundswell in South Africa’s Parliament has 
pushed for a constitutional amendment to Section 25 to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation. See Luke Daniel, Land Expropriation Report Adopted by Parliament, THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.thesouthafrican.com/land-expropriation-adopted-by-parliament/. 
While it is not my purpose to analyze the impact of such a constitutional amendment, its implications 
hover in the background of any conversation about land reform. 
17.  Katie Nodjimbadem, A Look Back at South Africa Under Apartheid, Twenty-Five Years After 
Its Repeal, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-did-
apartheid-south-africa-look-180956945/. 
18.  Tongoane & Others v. National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others 2010 (6) 
SA 214 (CC) ¶ 11 (S. Afr.) [hereafter Tongoane]. 
19. The South African General Elections: 1994, SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994. 
20.  Id.  
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dispossession of land relentlessly pursued under apartheid.21 Section 25 of 
the Bill of Rights (the “Property Clause”) sets out a concrete vision for 
land reform consisting of three “pillars”: (1) the restitution of land to those 
who were deprived of it through racially discriminatory laws and practices 
after the Natives (Black) Land Act of 1913; (2) the redistribution of land 
to create more equitable patterns of land ownership across the country, 
particularly in racial terms; and (3) improving security of tenure by 
upgrading the legal rights to land for those living on farms, working as 
labor tenants, or living in communal areas.22 
Despite this constitutional mandate, land reform has made scant 
headway since the end of apartheid. The country’s agrarian structure has 
barely been altered by land reform efforts, and it has had only minor 
positive impacts on rural livelihoods.23 There is a backlog of over 7,000 
unsettled restitution claims, which it is estimated will take 43 years to 
clear.24 Only 8-9% of farmland has been transferred through restitution 
and redistribution, and many settled restitution claims have not been fully 
implemented,25 in stark contrast to the government’s initial goal of 
transferring 30% of white-owned agricultural land by 2014 and settling all 
claims for redistribution by 2005.26 Tenure security, the third 
constitutional pillar of land reform, has overall received few resources.27  
 This Note will focus on the third pillar of tenure reform (security of 
 
21. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶¶ 27-28 (“Relentlessly, African people were dispossessed of their 
land and given legally insecure tenure over the land they occupied. One of the goals of our 
Constitution is to reverse all of this. It requires the restoration of land to people and communities that 
were dispossessed of land by colonial and apartheid laws after 19 June 1913. It also requires that 
people and communities whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of racially discriminatory 
colonial and apartheid laws be provided with legally secure tenure or comparable redress. CLARA was 
enacted with the declared purpose to “provide for legal security of tenure’”). 
22. Shaazia Ebrahim, The Land Question Part 1: What Is Land Reform?, THE DAILY VOX (Feb. 6, 
2017), http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/the-land-question-part-1-what-is-land-reform-shaazia-ebrahim/. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Peter Delius, It Could Take 200 Years and R600bn to Finalise New Land Claims, CITY PRESS 
(April 24, 2018), https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/it-could-take-200-years-and-r600bn-to-
finalise-new-land-claims-20180425. 
25.  Ben Cousins, LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA IS SINKING. CAN IT BE SAVED? 8 (2016), 
available at https://www.nelsonmandela.org/uploads/files/Land__law_and_leadership_-_paper_2.pdf. 
26. Henk Kloppers & Gerrit Pienaar, The Historical Context of Land Reform in South Africa and 
Early Policies, 17(2) POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC LAW JOURNAL/POTCHEFSTROOMSE 
ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD 677 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v17i2.03. 
27.  Cousins, supra note 25 at 4, 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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land tenure), in particular the need for legislation to upgrade and secure 
communal property rights.28 The Constitutional Court—South Africa’s 
highest—has made clear that whole communities may possess a collective 
right of ownership in land under indigenous law, and that these rights must 
be respected as being as authoritative as any conferred at common law.29 
Many of these rights, like the majority of indigenous law, have never been 
written down.30 In fact, it is estimated that nearly sixty percent of the 
country’s population hold land or dwellings outside of the formal property 
system.31 These rights are sometimes referred to as “informal” or “off-
 
28. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 25(6), 25(9) (A person or community whose . . . land is 
legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or ... comparable redress.. . . 
Parliament must enact the legislation . . . in subsection (6)). We are forced to confront a definitional 
problem at the very outset. Tenure security is a fundamentally contested issue. Indeed, one could see 
this entire Note as an attempt to provide a context specific definition of the concept. The South African 
Constitution does not define precisely what secure tenure looks like. In the most general sense 
“security of tenure” and “security of property rights” are interchangeable. See Chris D. Arnot, Martin 
K. Juckert & Peter C. Boxall, What is Tenure Security? Conceptual Implications for Empirical 
Analysis, 87 LAND ECONOMICS 297 (2011). However, it is important to note that, while legal title can 
be a proxy for and indicator of secure tenure, it is not a necessary or even sufficient precondition. Id. at 
303. Duration of tenure can also be an indicator of security, for example an illegal settler with an 
empirically low probability of eviction would have relatively secure tenure. Id. Thus security of tenure 
can only be understood with respect to empirical realities, it cannot be established just by examining 
the theoretical framework of property rights. “If the title is formal, legal, and state enforced, but the 
government is unstable, then the property rights associated with this title may not be very secure.” Id. 
Moreover, mere duration does not necessarily equate with tenure security. Embedded in the latter 
concept is the ability of the holder of the property right to realize the benefit derivable from the interest 
in land. Id. at 304. An individual who knew they weren’t going to be evicted but without title might be 
assured that their tenure will have duration but might also be denied access to the funds to invest, for 
example because they cannot use the land as collateral for a loan. Id. at 304-05. As we shall see, 
differing priorities yield different definitions of tenure security. If all you care about is using land as 
collateral, then individual titling schemes clearly provide the greatest security of tenure. However, 
when more complicated property rights relationships are figured in—such as reciprocal rights of use 
and access shared within a community as part of a joint cultural heritage—it becomes much more 
difficult to arrive at a precise definition. Because South Africa’s Constitution defines the mandate to 
secure tenure in the context of the racially discriminatory laws and practices that resulted in black 
South Africans having few rights in real property, this Note will begin by mapping the impact of those 
laws and policies to understand what insecure tenure looks like and thereby provide a basis to reverse 
engineer a working definition of tenure security in constitutional terms. 
29. Alexkor Ltd. & Another v. Richtersveld Community & Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) ¶¶ 50-62. 
30. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. 
31.  Rosalie Kingwell, A Proposal to End Insecurity of Land Tenure in South Africa, GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AFRICA (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170811150637/https://www.gga.org/a-proposal-to-end-insecurity-of-
land-tenure-in-south-africa/. 
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register,” as they are not recorded in the formal Deeds Registry.32  
Though the Constitution mandates the promulgation of tenure securing 
legislation, which includes legislation relating to communal property 
rights, a comprehensive statutory framework has yet to be realized.33 The 
Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) of 2004 was meant to be such a 
piece of legislation; however, it was declared unconstitutional on 
procedural grounds by the Constitutional Court in 2010 and never 
implemented.34 The Communal Land Tenure Bill (CLTB) was drafted to 
fill the void left by CLARA and was published for comment in July 2017 
but, as of 2019, remains stalled and has yet to reach Parliament.35 The Bill 
must strike a delicate balance between being precise enough to fulfill its 
constitutional obligations, pragmatic enough that its implementation 
doesn’t exceed the limited resources of the government, and flexible 
enough that it accounts for the fluid expression of indigenous law 
protected by the Constitutional Court’s “living customary law” 
 
32. Id. 
33. Various pieces of legislation serve as stopgap measures. For example, the Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996, which was only meant to last one year but has been renewed 
annually since, protects the informal rights of individuals lacking documentary evidence of their 
claims to land. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 protects the occupiers of land in 
rural or peri-urban areas, mostly farm workers and dwellers. The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 
of 1996 creates a process whereby labor tenants on privately owned farms can obtain ownership of the 
land they occupy. The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 enables the creation of legal 
entities to take ownership of communal land. Rosalie Kingwill et al., The Policy Context: Land Tenure 
Laws and Policies in Post-apartheid South Africa, in UNTITLED: SECURING LAND TENURE IN URBAN 
AND RURAL SOUTH AFRICA 44, 62-69 (Donna Hornby et al., eds., University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 
2017). 
34. Id. at 73-74. In Tongoane the Constitutional Court held that CLARA in substantial measure 
affected matters of indigenous law, customary tenure, and traditional leadership and therefore should 
have been enacted according to the procedures set out in section 76 of the Constitution. Tongoane, 
2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 97. Because Parliament incorrectly tagged it a section 75 Bill, following the process 
set out in that section, the provinces were denied their “constitutional role that the provinces must play 
in considering legislation which affects them.” Id.  ¶ 109. The Court held that this procedural defect 
rendered CLARA “unconstitutional in its entirety.” Id. ¶ 110. Because of this procedural ruling, the 
Court never reached the substantive questions presented concerning whether CLARA’s version of 
customary property rights comported with the requirements of the Constitution and the empirical 
realities. Id. ¶ 116. Thus, while we know that customary and communal rights in land are protected in 
form, the actual content of those rights is fundamentally contested. Much of this Note will be a 
discussion of competing visions of those rights gleaned from the works of anthropologists, theorists, 
and the writings of the Court itself. While Tongoane provides, in dicta, an historical and legal 
jumping-off point, it leaves the ultimate questions for another day.  
35. Communal Land Tenure Bill 2017, GN 510 of GG 40965 (7 July 2017), 
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/legislation-and-policies/file/5426. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18














This Note proposes an alternative solution that seeks to combine the 
best aspects of various pieces of legislation into an implementable 
statutory framework. Rather than attempt to articulate exhaustively the 
substance of communal land rights, the proposal emphasizes procedural 
rights, effective dispute resolution, and affordable modern surveying 
methods as a way of efficiently providing a trajectory toward tenure 
security within the capacity of official resources.  
 Part I of this Note examines the history of apartheid laws and policies 
as described by the Constitutional Court in order to formulate a working 
understanding of the meaning of tenure security in terms of constitutional 
minimum standards. Part II looks at three differing theories of tenure 
security in the context of indigenous law. Part III considers three 
alternative legislative attempts to secure tenure–one proposed, one 
hypothetical, and one that is already in effect. Part IV weighs the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the competing theories and statutes, judging 
them against the minimum standards discernible from Part I.  
Finally, Part V lays out the proposal for a new legislative approach for 
achieving communal tenure security. This boils down to four basic policy 
principles from which to develop tenure securing legislation: (1) policies 
of quick and cost-effective surveying; (2) accessible dispute resolution to 
simultaneously resolve contested land rights and build a body of law 
around communal property mores; (3) a starter title scheme to provide a 
modicum of security to those whose tenure is most tenuous; and (4) 
systematic investment in Communal Property Associations and local 
governance organizations. These principles will stabilize the management 
of communal property, begin the process of formalizing off-register land 
rights, provide economic security and liquidity to those living and working 
on land to which they have no documentation at present, and provide a 
mechanism for the vindication of indigenous property rights in court. Not 
only will this begin the process of securing land tenure for millions of 
South Africans, it will do so in a way that attempts to fuse indigenous and 
common law concepts according to the vision of the Constitutional Court.  
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I. HISTORY OF APARTHEID LAWS & POLICIES 
 
“Awakening on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African 
native found himself, not actually, a slave, but a pariah in the land of his 
birth.”36 The passage of the Natives Land Act (also called the Black Land 
Act)37 reserved 87% of South Africa’s land for the ruling white minority, 
driving the bulk of the nation’s population onto the remaining 13% and 
creating overnight a “floating, landless proletariat whose labour could be 
used and manipulated at will, and ensured that the land had finally and 
securely passed into the hands of the ruling white race.”38  
Even criminals dropping straight from the gallows have an undisputed 
claim to six feet of ground in which to rest their criminal remains. But 
under the cruel operation of the Land Act little children, whose only crime 
is that God did not make them white, are sometimes denied that right in 
their ancestral home.39 
The Black Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 
were key in determining where African people could live and precluded 
them from purchasing land in most of South Africa.40 In 1936 the 
Development Trust and Land Act established the South African Native 
Trust, setting aside land for native peoples and granting the Governor-
General the power to regulate, among other things, the conditions under 
which natives could purchase, hire, and occupy trust lands.41  
 
36.  SOL. T. PLAATJE, NATIVE LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA, BEFORE AND SINCE THE EUROPEAN WAR 
AND THE BOER REBELLION 16 (South African History Online 4th ed.) (1916), available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Native%20Life%20in%20South%20Africa_0.pdf. 
37.  Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 11. 
38.  Ebrahim, supra note 22 (quoting foreword by Bessie Head to original edition of PLAATJE, supra 
note 36). 
39. PLAATJE, supra note 36, at 66. 
40. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 12.  
41. Id. ¶ ¶ 14-15 stating: 
 
The land that vested in the Trust was “held for the exclusive use and benefit of natives”. 
The Trustee had the power to “grant, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land . . . to 
natives” and “on such conditions as he [deemed] fit”. Further, the Governor General had 
the power to make regulations, among other things, “prescribing the conditions upon 
which natives may purchase, hire or occupy land held by the Trust” and “providing for 
the allocation of land held by the Trust for the purposes of residence, cultivation, 
pasturage and commonage. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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In 1969 these conditions were comprehensively addressed by the Bantu 
Areas Land Regulations42 and the Township Regulations,43 which 
pertained to rural and urban areas respectively.44 The Bantu Areas Land 
Regulations “recognised two forms of land tenure, namely, quitrent tenure 
of land and occupation of land under permission to occupy.”45 Quitrent, 
though defined as a “title deed relating to land,” did not confer full 
ownership as it was subject to conditions imposed by regulation. The title 
deed could not be transferred without the consent of the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner and could be cancelled for noncompliance with any of the 
conditions upon which it had been granted or in the event the holder was 
convicted for certain offenses such as theft or the possession or dealing of 
drugs.46 Permissions to Occupy (PTOs) were similar, though, if anything, 
provided fewer rights in land than quitrent.47 Africans could not even be 
absent from their allotted land without permission from the Commissioner. 
Absence for more than a year without permission resulted in the land 
reverting to commonage and becoming eligible for re-allocation.48  
In Tongoane, decided in 2010, the Constitutional Court examined this 
history in detail and used it to derive an understanding of tenure 
insecurity.49 Insecurity of tenure is an effect of a history in which Africans 
were systematically dispossessed of land and relocated,50 granted 
 
42.  Id. ¶ 16 (citing Bantu Areas Land Regulations, GN R.188 of GG 2468 (11 July 1969)). 
43.  Id. (citing Regulations for the Administration and Control of Townships in Bantu Areas, GN 
R.293 of GG 373 (16 November 1962)). 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. ¶ 17 (footnotes omitted). 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. ¶ 18 (“Substantially similar conditions applied to the permission to occupy.  However, in 
the case of the permission to occupy, the regulations made it clear that ‘[p]ermission granted to occupy 
the allotment shall not convey ownership.’”). 
48.  Id. ¶ 19. 
49.  Id. ¶ 21 (“What emerges from these regulations therefore is that (a) the tenure in land which 
was subject to the provisions of the Black Land Act and Development Trust and Land Act and which 
was held by African people was precarious and legally insecure”).  
50.  Id. ¶ 25 describing: 
 
Under apartheid, these steps were a necessary prelude to the assignment of African 
people to ethnically-based homelands.  This commenced with the creation of “legislative 
assemblies” which would mature into “self-governing territories” and ultimately into 
“independent states”. According to this plan, there would be no African people in South 
Africa, as all would assume citizenship of one or other of the newly created homelands, 
where they could enjoy social, economic and political rights. Section 5(1)(b) of the Black 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conditional title to what land they were allocated,51 and tolerated in 
“white” South Africa only to the extent they provided a necessary labor 
force.52 The purpose of Section 25(6) of the Constitution, requiring that 
parliament pass legislation combating insecurity of tenure, is to reverse 
this history.53  
In 2004 with Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and 
Others,54 the Constitutional Court found that a community, which had 
inhabited a large portion of land for centuries,55 possessed a “right of 
communal ownership under indigenous law” in the subject land.56 The 
Court refers to this communal right—which it held to include the 
exclusive use and occupation of the land—as ‘title.’57 When attempting to 
understand the “nature and content” of the rights that make up this form of 
 
Administration Act became the most powerful tool to effect the removal of African 
people from “white” South Africa into areas reserved for them under this Act and the 
Development Trust and Land Act.  And as we noted in DVB Behuising, “[t]hese 
removals resulted in untold suffering.” The forced removals of African people from the 
land which they occupied to the limited amount of land reserved for them by the 
apartheid state resulted in the majority of African people being dispossessed of their land.  
It also left a majority of them without legally secure tenure in land. 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. ¶ 26 detailing: 
 
The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 197056 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution 
Act, 197157 further entrenched land dispossession as a key policy of the apartheid 
edifice.  African people would, as a consequence, have no claim to any land in “white” 
South Africa.  African people were tolerated in “white” South Africa only to the extent 
that they were needed to provide labour to run the economy.  They had precarious title to 
the land they occupied to remind them of the impermanence of their residence in “white” 
South Africa. 
 
53. Id. ¶ 28 describing: 
 
One of the goals of our Constitution is to reverse all of this.  It requires the restoration of 
land to people and communities that were dispossessed of land by colonial and apartheid 
laws after 19 June 1913.  It also requires that people and communities whose tenure of 
land is legally insecure as a result of racially discriminatory colonial and apartheid laws 
be provided with legally secure tenure or comparable redress.  CLARA was enacted with 
the declared purpose to “provide for legal security of tenure.” 
 
54. 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). 
55. Id. ¶ 4. 
56. Id. ¶ 62. 
57. Id. 
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title, the Court concluded that such rights must be determined with 
reference to indigenous law, and not viewed through the distorting prism 
of the common law.58 Indigenous law “depends for its ultimate force and 
validity on the Constitution”59 and courts are obliged to “apply customary 
law when it is applicable.”60 When doing so “the courts must have regard 
to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”61 The Court makes 
it very clear that indigenous law is subject to the Constitution and must be 
“interpreted in light of its values”, offering a jurisprudential model in 
which “indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part 
of the amalgam of South African law.”62 
The Alexkor Court does not provide a concrete test for resolving 
conflicting views of the content of indigenous law,63 noting only that “[b]y 
its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their 
patterns of life”64 and may be established by “reference to writers on 
indigenous law and other authorities and sources, and may include the 
evidence of witnesses if necessary,” but that caution should be taken 
“when dealing with textbooks and old authorities because of the tendency 
to view indigenous law through the prism of legal conceptions that are 
foreign to it.”65 The Court concluded that the “determination of the real 
character of indigenous title to land therefore ‘involves the study of the 
history of a particular community and its usages.’ So does the 
determination of its content.”66 This position was reiterated and affirmed 
in 2013 with the Court’s decision in Pilane and Another v Pilane and 
 
58. Id. ¶ 50. 
59. Id. ¶ 51. 
60. Id; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 211(3). 
61. Id. § 39(2). 
62. Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 51.  
63. Id. at ¶ 54. 
64. Id. at ¶ 52. 
65. Id. at ¶ 54. 
66. Id. at ¶ 57 ((quoting Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399, 404 
(PC) (appeal taken from S. Afr.) (“There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render that 
title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English 
law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely. The title, such as it is, may not be that of the 
individual, as in this country it nearly always is in some form, but may be that of a community. . . . To 
ascertain how far this latter development of right has progressed involves the study of the history of 
the particular community and its usages in each case. Abstract principles fashioned a priori are of but 
little assistance and are as often as not misleading.”). 
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Our history. . . is replete with instances in which customary law was 
not given the necessary space to evolve, but was instead fossilized 
and “stone-walled” through codification, which distorted its 
mutable nature and subverted its operation. The Constitution is 
designed to reverse this trend and to facilitate the preservation and 
evolution of customary law as a legal system that conforms with its 
provisions.68 
 
The Court is not blind to the fact that this process of reversal has the 
potential for conflict. It is almost inevitable in a “living body” of “active 
and dynamic” law “with an inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the 
changing lives of the people whom it governs”69 that differences of 
interpretation and competing claims to authority will arise. Pilane does not 
resolve these tensions. If anything, it exacerbates them by allowing that 
“statutory authority accorded to traditional leadership does not necessarily 
preclude or restrict the operation of customary leadership that has not been 
recognized by legislation.”70 The best framework for resolving these 
tensions is “uncharted legal terrain” and an important issue for future 
litigation to grapple with.71  
Tenure security is thus located within a shifting legal landscape. Alexkor 
and Pilane require that ‘indigenous title’ be determined by referencing the 
living, customary law. Tongoane articulates a lofty aim for tenure 
security—to heal the wounds left by the systematic dispossession of 
African land and the damage done by viewing black South Africans as 
nothing more than a standing reserve of labour, to be tolerated so long as 
they were productive and then sent back to their Homelands.   
 
 
67. 2013(4) BCLR 431 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
68. Id. ¶ 35 (footnotes omitted). 
69. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 
¶¶ 87, 90). 
70. Id. ¶ 44. 
71. Id. ¶ 45.  
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II. COMPETING THEORIES BEHIND TENURE REFORM 
 
A. Property Rights as Reciprocal and Nested 
 
Understanding customary law is complicated by the fact that the only 
early written records of indigenous practices are refracted through the 
“distorting prism” of colonization, and in particular the European 
construct of absolute ownership.72 Of the numerous misconceptions 
developed by colonial and post-colonial jurists regarding indigenous law 
in Africa, it has been suggested that five fundamental fallacies stand out in 
explaining the distortions that traditional law has undergone up to the 
present: (1) that indigenous law was not really law at all, as it didn’t derive 
from a sovereign authority, and therefore tribal groups required ordering 
through the imposition of foreign law; (2) indigenous law conferred no 
property in land; (3) ultimate title could only vest in the colonial 
sovereign; (4) indigenous communities had no juridical persona; and (5) 
indigenous institutions were incapable of, or unsuitable for, allocating and 
managing land.73 These fallacies, particularly the belief that indigenous 
communities had no juridical persona, gave rise to the notion that tribal 
tenure must always be mediated through some form of trusteeship.74  
Moreover, scholars argue that many of the distortions suffered by 
indigenous law were not merely the result of erroneously viewing 
customary law through a European lens, but also the product of a 
deliberate attempt by colonial powers to construct a version of traditional 
authority amenable to their control.75 “It was in the interests of both 
[colonial officials and African male elders] to elevate the power of chiefs, 
and downplay the rights of ordinary people, particularly women.”76 
Theophilus Shepstone’s strategy for colonial control as Natal’s Secretary 
for Native Affairs was to deputize the existing tribal hierarchies, allowing 
 
72. Aninka Claasens, ‘Communal Land,’ Property Rights and Traditional Leadership, RURAL 
WOMEN’S ACTION RESEARCH PROGRAMME, CENTRE FOR LAW AND SOCIETY, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE 
TOWN (July 2014), https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/documents/Claassens2014.pdf. 
73. Okoth-Ogendo, The Nature of Land Rights Under Indigenous Law in Africa, in LAND, POWER 
& CUSTOM 95, 96-97 (Claasens & Cousins eds., 2008). 
74. Id. 
75. Claasens, supra note 72. 
76. Id. See also Affidavit for Benjamin Cousins in Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 72-75. 
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them to continue the day-to-day management of their people but making 
clear that ultimate authority resided with the British conquerors.77  
A series of early twentieth century cases ossified a vision of despotic 
chiefly power which conformed neatly with the European model of feudal 
authority. Within this feudal paradigm, power was thought to derive 
exclusively from the monarch and flow down to the subjects.78 Courts 
denied that tribal chiefs would have required any form of consent from the 
community to alienate land,79 and held that individual members of a tribe 
were incapable of private ownership of real property.80  
Some scholars and anthropologists argue that this version of customary 
law, created to suit the strategic needs of the ruling class, is inconsistent 
with the realities of traditional power structures and land rights, which are 
far more nuanced than the iterations cemented in statute and judicial 
opinion. Benjamin Cousins insists that “[a] key feature of ‘communal’ 
systems is the layered nature of units of social organization. Different 
units, for example the family, clan, village, ‘location’ and ‘tribe’ nest 
within one another.” Therefore, the term ‘communal’ can be misleading, 
as there are “strong individual rights within ‘communal’ systems.”81  
Tom Bennett identifies three serious misconceptions arising from the 
 
77. Reitz Bloemfontein, Native Policy: the Reitz-Shepstone Correspondence of 1891-1892, 2 
NATALIA 10, 17 (1972). A Letter from Theophilus Shepstone states:  
 
Use their influence, their system of tribal management, their principle of mutual 
responsibility; make room for these in your own system. Let the chiefs understand that they 
rule as your lieutenants that they carry out your behests, subject to your general 
supervision, even in tribal matters. Pay them fairly. They will prove loyal and zealous, 
inclined, perhaps, to severity rather than otherwise; correct this by giving their people the 
privilege of appeal to a white magistrate, and ultimately to a still higher tribunal. Forbid, 
except by special leave, the performance of any function devised to keep up the idea of 
tribal independence. 
 
78. Classens, supra note 72, at 5 (“It is hardly disputed… that the powers exercised by chiefs… 
were of a despotic character.” (citations and internal quotation omitted)). 
79. Id. at 6 (“[I]n the purchase or sale of land there is no obligation on the chief to obtain the 
consent of, or even to consult his people.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
80. Id. at 6-7 (“[N]o member of a tribe can ever acquire ownership of any land allotted to him.” 
(internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
81. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 35. 
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effort to express customary land rights in Western terms.82 The first is that 
ownership was a concept of ‘civilized society’ and therefore unknown to 
native Africans.83 Bennett points out that, not only has this notion been 
dispelled academically, but it has been legally banished by “implication of 
the fact that customary law interests are protected in post-1994 legislation” 
in South Africa.84 The second misconception is to view customary tenure 
only as ‘communal,’ thus precluding individual rights in property. Bennett 
asserts that, while ‘communal’ might aptly describe rights to pasture and 
natural resources, it does not accurately portray communal tenure with 
respect to residential land or arable plots.85 Finally, the third 
misconception is that all customary tenure must be the equivalent of a trust 
in which it was often implied that allodial title vested in the tribe, the chief 
was trustee, and the community members had only usufructuary rights.86 
The word ‘trust’ has partial descriptive accuracy in that it denotes a chief’s  
responsibilities with respect to the community members. However, 
reducing individual tenure to a set of usufructuary rights does not “do 
justice to a landholder’s interests in customary law.”87 Moreover, the 
concept of a trust is impotent in situations where the trustee abuses their 
power, for customary landholders are denied the remedies afforded trust 
beneficiaries at common law.88 
Cousins maintains that “very many people live in practice under a 
system which derives from indigenous tenure.”89 That system has been 
described as a “land ethic” or “social tenure systems of relative rights”90 or 
 
82. Tom Bennett, ‘Official’ vs ‘Living’ Customary Law: Dilemmas of Description and Recognition, 
in LAND, CUSTOM & POWER: CONTROVERSIES GENERATED BY SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMUNAL LAND 
RIGHTS ACT 138 (Aninka Claasens & Ben Cousins eds., 2008). 
83. Id. at 142. 
84. Id. at 142 n.17. 
85. Id. at 143. 
86. Id. at 143-44. 
87. Id. at 144. 
88. Id. It seems that no one has explored the possibility that traditional common law causes of 
action such as breach of trust and fiduciary duty could be imported into the communal property 
context. Bennett takes this failure to be an inherent feature of the trust concept when applied to 
communal property systems. Though he may be correct in practice, it is not obvious that beneficiaries 
of communal property trusts should necessarily be denied the remedies afforded beneficiaries of trusts 
at common law.  
89. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 61. 
90. Id. ¶ 59. 
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as a “web of reciprocal rights and obligations that bind together and vest 
power in community members” as a “function of membership in the 
family, lineage or community maintained through active participation in 
processes of production and social organization.”91 This land ethic 
undergirds a superstructure of conventional law that, for the most part, 
either ignores or actively subverts it.92 However, these indigenous norms 
and structures have proved both resilient and persistent, and form the 
essential basis for tenure security for many South Africans.93 Still, the 
rights they provide are not accurately recognized by law, something 
Cousins identifies as a serious issue for tenure security.94 One of the 
primary ways in which the formal legal system neglected indigenous 
rights is in its failure to understand their “nested” quality.95 
 This means that control of land is vested at different levels of the social 
organization depending on the resource in question. “For example, 
allocations of arable land are often controlled at the level of the family and 
the neighborhood, while grazing and woodland use is the concern of a 
wider segment of society. Members have the right to participate in 
decision-making processes at the appropriate level.”96 It is in this way that 
the rights of individuals and sub-groups are protected by customary mores. 
Power over different aspects of the use and control of property vests at 
different levels of the socio-political community, in which individuals, 
neighbors, “headmen,” and “sub-headman” all have crucial roles to play.97  
 
 
91. Claasens, supra note 66. 
92. Id. 
93. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶¶ 59, 61. 
94. Id. ¶ 61. 
95. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Okoth-Ogendo has proposed that, in light of this theory of indigenous land rights, 
tenure security be defined as an assurance that: 
 
[A]ccess to land resources will always be available as long as membership in a 
community and equivalent use functions are maintained; the land resources of the 
community will always be preserved for the sole enjoyment of its members; land 
resources remain also available to future generations; and community land resources are 
generally not alienable outside the group unless this is in the interest of its members.  
 
Id. 
96. Id. ¶ 69. 
97. Id. ¶ 74. 
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Cousins conducted research into customary land allocation in Msinga, 
an area under the administration of the Ingonyama Trust.98 He reported 
that, should an outsider desire to seek access to land in the community, it 
is necessary for them to go through a detailed procedure established by 
custom.99 A local champion is required to vouch for the character of the 
applicant to potential neighbors.100 The nduna (headman) of the area is 
asked for assistance and the applicant then approaches the nkosi (chief) 
with a letter of reference from the tribal office of the area he is moving 
from explaining that he is of good character, not subject to criminal 
charges, and listing his reasons for moving.101 Should the nkosi accept the 
applicant the nduna will call a meeting of the ibandla (a local assembly of 
men ‘old enough to be wise’) and the potential neighbors where the 
applicant will provide beer and the land will be demarcated in front of 
everyone as witnesses.102 This is evidence of the vertical and horizontal 
segmentation of land control within the socio-political community where 
“[n]eighbours, ibandla and izinduna [headmen] play key roles in accepting 
and validating requests for land, demarcating boundaries and resolving 
disputes.”103  Following this procedure confers membership in the 
community of which neighbors, ibandla, and izinduna are a part and it is 
from this membership—rather than a formal transfer of title—that secure 
rights to land in the community are derived.104   
 
98. BEN COUSINS, SUBMISSION TO THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 15 OF 2008, 1-2 § 1.2 (2008). 




103. BEN COUSINS, THE ‘LIVING CUSTOMARY LAW OF LAND’ IN MSINGA, KWAZULU-NATAL, 
UNTITLED: SECURING LAND TENURE IN URBAN AND RURAL SOUTH AFRICA 145 (Donna Hornby, 
Rosalie Kingwill, Lauren Royston & Ben Cousins, eds., University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 2017). 
See also, Ben Cousins & Aninka Claasens, More Than Simply ‘Socially Embedded’: Recognizing the 
Distinctiveness of African Land Rights, Keynote Address at the International Symposium on ‘At the 
frontier of land issues: social embeddedness of rights and public policy’ (May 17-19 2006) at 22-23 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7304/3007f91122069355a6c561b028905f7fe411.pdf.  
104. Ben Cousins, Characterising ‘Communal’ Tenure: Nested Systems and Flexible Boundaries, in 
LAND, CUSTOM & POWER: CONTROVERSIES GENERATED BY SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMUNAL LAND 
RIGHTS ACT 109, 112-13 (Aninka Claasens & Ben Cousins eds., 2008) (“Land rights, as in the pre-
colonial era, are closely inter-related with social and cultural relationships more generally and the 
identities associated with these…Tenure security derives in large part from locally legitimate 
landholding rather than law.”) Id. 
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B. Property Rights as Hierarchical & Non-Racial 
 
The conception of property rights as layered and nested in the 
traditional context is disputed. Some have insisted that it is an 
“unsupported view of customary law” proffered by a “small group of 
dissident intellectuals” in order to challenge the “institution of traditional 
leadership.”105  
Sipho Sibanda argues that colonial and apartheid governments did more 
than simply “impose a distorted version of customary law on pre-existing 
indigenous land tenure systems” but actually, in many instances, created 
“current communal lands to achieve their policies of segregation and to 
serve as sources of cheap labour.”106 
Jan Bekker details how some of these policies continually redefined the 
extent of communal lands through the forced segregation of people in 
“white” and “Bantu” areas; the consolidation of homelands; rampant 
urbanization; the establishment of formal townships and the dramatic 
effects of economic development and industrialization.107 Moreover, 
Bekker points out that there often was no fixed, definable tribal boundary 
to the land in the first place. “[T]he tribal territory naga (literally, land, 
also sometimes called lefase, literally, the earth) extended as far as the 
tribe could competently exploit it, without having really well-defined 
boundaries.”108 This makes it difficult to reconstruct a pre-colonial 
topography of communal land rights. Bekker also questions the way in 
which “communal land tenure is generally assumed to be African land 
tenure,” implying that there may be other ethnic groups deserving of 
security of communal tenure whose claims cannot be articulated in racial 
terms.109 The effect of these violent mutations in the history of South 
African land tenure is that “the present government cannot base its 
communal land tenure reform on Utopian pre-colonial traditional land 
 
105. Pleadings in Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214, Volume 2 “B”, First respondents answering affidavit 
[Dr Sipho Sibanda] ¶ 3.4. 
106. Id. ¶ 4.2. 
107. Id. ¶¶ 6.1-6.2. 
108. Id. ¶ 7.2. 
109. Id. ¶ 6.3. 
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In 2006, Samuel Khunou was appointed by the National Minister for 
Provincial and Local Government to “conduct research on communal land 
systems, traditional institutions and related in matters in respect of 
Makgobistad traditional community, including Mayaeyana.”111 This 
research included a survey of pertinent literature concerning the area and 
material from the National Archives; “[v]arious legislation and 
proclamations” defining the land area and tribal authority; case law; tribal 
records, and in-depth interviews with individuals.112 From this Khunou 
concluded it “appeared quite obvious that Mayaeyane was a traditional 
community and the land was communally ‘owned’. Of significance is that 
the senior traditional leader played an important role in the administration 
of communal land.”113 Khunou qualifies the idea of communal ownership 
by noting that the “control of the land on which the community had settled 
vested in the headman and he allotted (with the sanction of the senior 
traditional leader) land to the heads of families for purposes of 
residence.”114 Some land was also allotted for cultivation and grazing, and 
other for commonage.115 
Khunou examines the evolution of the community in terms of  the 
theory of “structural stratification or functionalism” which views the 
“social world [as] for all time divided into rulers and ruled.”116 He states 
that the “headman of Mayaeyane and the Kgosi of Makgobistad had 
authority and legitimacy” and that it was clear the “community. . . 
consented to the authority of the headman.”117 He also maintains that the 
individuals he interviewed did not view themselves as owners of their 
property, but rather “recognized the kgosi and the headman as the 
‘owners’ of the land who served their interests.”118 However, this is not to 
 
110. Id. ¶ 8.4. 
111. Affidavit of Samuel Freddy Khunou at 1466-1508 ¶ 6 in Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214. 
112. Id. ¶ 10. 
113. Id. ¶ 16.6. 
114. Id. ¶ 17.4. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. ¶ 18.2 (citing Haralambos, M; Holborn, M & Heald, R, Sociology Themes and Perspectives 
90-91 (London 2004)). 
117. Id. ¶ 18.3. Khunou cites ANTHONY GIDDENS, SOCIOLOGY (3d ed. 1989) to support the latter 
proposition. The relevance of the source in this context seems arguable. 
118. Id. ¶ 18.5. 
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say that individuals did not have rights in land, it is rather to say they did 
not own the land allocated to them in a common law sense. Khunou calls 
this a “traditional right to . . . land,” described as “more than the right of 
possessio or usufruct but less than full ownership (dominium).”119 Thus, 
landholders may not dispose of land or sell it, but neither may anyone—
including the kgosi—arbitrarily deprive them of their use of it.120  
Individuals access to land is situated within a structure of rights 
pertaining to the family group.121 Essentially, the “right of use and 
occupation of land by an individual is subject to the customary law of 
communal ‘ownership.’ It is generally accepted that traditional 
communities in South Africa did not recognize a system of individual land 
tenure”:122 
 
All land occupied by a tribe is vested in the Chief and administered 
by him as head of the tribe. This he does through his sub-Chiefs and 
headmen who regulate the distribution and use of land in their 
respective areas. The land is not his personal possession with which 
he can deal as he pleases. None of the land belongs to the Chief nor 
can he dispose of it.123  
 
Khunou agrees with Bekker that communal ownership can be a non-
racial concept. He points to examples of traditional authorities allocating 
land to Afrikaner and Coloured families124 in accordance with customary 
practice.125 Khunou, Bekker, and Sibanda offer a starkly different version 
of customary law than that provided by Claasens, Cousins, and Okoth-
Ogendo. Rather than reciprocal and nested, they see property rights as 
hierarchical, with ownership largely concentrated at the apex of tribal 
authority.  
 
119. Id. ¶ 20.6 (citing Olivier NJ et al., Indigenous Law South Africa 3 (1988)). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.6. 
122. Id. ¶ 23.4. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. ¶ 21.4. 
125. It is important to note that Sibanda, Bekker, and Khunou are writing in the context of a legal 
attack on the Communal Land Rights Act, 11 of 2004 (CLARA), which was subsequently ruled 
unconstitutional on procedural grounds. They do not put forward a definition of secure tenure, but it 
can be implied from the context of the litigation that CLARA itself is their model of tenure security.  
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C. Individual Titling as the Gold Standard of Property Rights 
 
Some commentators and policy-makers consider the entire project of 
securing tenure in terms of communal property rights flawed and instead 
argue that private ownership with registered title deeds constitutes the 
‘gold standard’ of tenure reform.126 They argue that communal tenure 
discourages conservation and improvement because farmers do not benefit 
from the increased value of the land they work;127 that it is difficult to 
finance because banks are unwilling to extend credit on un-lienable 
property;128 that it is vulnerable to nepotism;129 and that it is unclear if it is 
even something supported by the majority of individuals affected.130 
For the last proposition, commentators point to the failed attempt to 
institute Ujamaa, a form of African socialism, in Tanzania in the 1960’s 
and 70’s.131 Under this system, villages were consolidated with 
appurtenant land for the purpose of collective farming.132 The rationale for 
this shift was that it would make it easier for the government to provide 
technical assistance and services, while at the same time establishing a 
system which adhered to African values of cooperation and mutual 
assistance.133 Over ten years after implementation, only fifteen percent of 
land had been collectivized, and much of that had been achieved through 
coercion.134 The people rejected Ujamaa, and the result undermined the 
project of African socialism as a whole.135 
 
Proponents of private ownership argue that individualized tenure, 
typically defined as demarcation and registration of freehold title, is 
superior to communal titling models because it gives owners incentives to 
 
126. Cousins, supra note 17, at 9. 
127. Lauren G. Robinson, Rationales for Rural Land Redistribution, in South Africa, 23 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 465, 499 (1997) (citing Russell King, Land Reform 358-59 (1977)). 
128. Id. (citing Sebastian Mallaby, After Apartheid, The Future of South Africa 141 (1992)). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 499-500. 
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use the land most efficiently, thereby maximizing agriculture’s 
contribution to social well-being.136 
 
III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE TENURE 
 
A. Communal Land Tenure Bill 
 
As of 2019, South Africa’s Parliament has not enacted permanent 
legislation to legally secure tenure for the victims of the nation’s 
repressive colonial and apartheid legacy, as mandated by Section 25 of the 
Constitution.137 A preliminary attempt, the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLARA) of 2004, sat on the books for six years without being 
implemented.138 In 2010 it was declared unconstitutional on procedural 
grounds.139  
 In July 2017, the government of South Africa proposed new legislation 
to replace CLARA.140 The Communal Land Tenure Bill (CLTB) proposes 
that communal land be vested directly in the community,141 loosely 
defined as a group of people with shared rules determining access to 
commonly held land.142 It is the duty of the Minister of Rural 
 
136. Scott J. Shackelford, Neither Magic Bullet Nor Lost Cause: Land Titling and the Wealth of 
Nations, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 272, 332 (2014) (citing Richard Barrows & Michael Roth, Land 
Tenure & Investment in African Agriculture: Theory and Evidence, 28 (2) J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 265, 
265 (1990)). 
137.  See Ebrahim, supra note 12. 
138.  Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 73, at 104 n.2. 
139.  Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 133. 
140.  Communal Land Tenure Bill 2017, GN 510 of GG 40965 (7 July 2017), 
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/legislation-and-policies/file/5426. 
141. Communal Land Tenure Bill 2017, ch. 1 § 2. 
142. Id. at ch. 1 § 1.  (“‘Community’ means a group of persons whose rights to land are derived 
from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group regardless of its ethnic, 
tribal, religious or racial identity and includes a traditional community”). The potential problems 
associated with this vague definition of community have been pointed out by Beinart infra note 165, 
stating: 
 
Is the community with shared rules intended to mean a group settled within an existing 
political boundary, such as a municipality or a ward?  If community implies a unit that 
derives shared rules from customary practices and retains boundaries from the homeland 
era, such as an old Tribal Authority area, or a traditional council recognised under the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003), then it is more likely to 
come under the influence or control of traditional authorities. This seems to be implied in 
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Development and Land Reform (Minister), in consultation with the 
community, to determine the location and extent of the land to convert to 
communal ownership.143 
 In order to begin this process, the Minister is required to initiate a land 
rights enquiry.144 It is the function of the enquirer to investigate, among 
other things, the nature and extent of land rights, state’s interests, and 
options available to ensure legally secure tenure.145 The Minister then uses 
the results of this enquiry to make a determination about the location and 
extent of communal land.146 
Communities must choose a legal entity to administer their land, a 
communal property association, a traditional council, or some other entity 
“approved by the Minister.”147 A communal property association is a 
juristic person capable of holding and managing land for a community in 
terms of a written constitution.148 A traditional council, which many 
communities already possess, is an authoritative body structured according 
to customary law and recognized by statute.149 These administrative bodies 
 
some sections of the Bill. If it is a smaller village grouping, then there may be more 
diverse strategies for landholding? How small a group can act as a ‘community’ for the 
purposes of the Bill. If a cluster of ten families living in the same area wish to have 
‘shared rules’ expressed as private rights to their land, can they apply to the Department 
separately from a larger group around them? Quitrent or individual Glen Grey holdings 
in the Eastern Cape have in theory been upgraded to private title. But some of these exist 
within districts where there are also areas of former ‘Permission to Occupy’ or communal 
tenure. Which ‘shared rules’ will shape the community in this area. 
 
143. Id. at ch. 2 § 5(1). 
144. Id. at ch. 6 § 20. 
145. Id. at ch. 6 § 22. 
146. Id. at ch. 2 § 5(2). 
147. Id. § 28. 
148. Communal Property Associations Act of 1996 (“To enable communities to form juristic 
persons, to be known as communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage 
property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written constitution; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.”). 
149. Section 211 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he institution, status and role of traditional 
leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution.” Pursuant to the 
Constitution the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (Framework Act) 
was enacted to provide formal recognition to traditional councils. This Act introduced two 
requirements to democratize traditional councils. The first mandates that at least a third of the total 
number of council members are women. The second, that 60% of the members of the council are 
selected by the senior traditional leader and 40% are democratically elected from the community. 
Rural Women’s Action Research Programme, Questioning the Legal Status of Traditional Councils in 
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are tasked with specific functions regarding the community’s land.150  
 The community must also establish a representative body— the 
Households Forum—which is made up members of the community and 
appointees of the relevant traditional council or communal property 
association and the municipality with jurisdiction over the community.151 
In addition, the Households Forum must be half women, and three 
members must represent the interests of vulnerable community members, 
such as child-headed households, the elderly, and the disabled.152  
 The community must also adopt and register community rules by a 
60% majority vote of households.153 After the rules are adopted, the 
community applies to have them registered with the Director-General of 
the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, who reviews 
them to see if they comply with “the rules of natural justice, the 
Constitution” and the Bill itself.154 If the Director-General is not satisfied, 
they work with the community to remedy the defects.155 If a community 
fails to adopt and register its own community rules, a set of prescribed 
standard rules will be applied, subject to adaptation by the Minister.156 
 
South Africa, 1-2 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/CLS_TCStatus_Factsheet_Aug2013.pdf. As of yet, the 
vast majority of traditional councils have not met the requirements of the Framework Act. Id. at 2. The 
legal significance of this failure is not apparent. Id. It is also interesting to note that the traditional 
councils given formal recognition in the Framework Act derive from apartheid law. Id. at 1 (see Bantu 
Authorities Act of 1951).  
150. Communal Land Tenure Bill 2017, § 29(a)-(h). 
151. Id. at ch. 9. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 26. These rules are to regulate: 
 
(a) the general management and administration of communal land; (b) the nature of rights 
to subdivided portions of communal land; (c) the alienation or termination of rights 
other than ownership rights;  (d) the allocation of subdivided portions of communal 
land; (e) the keeping of communal land register; (f) the use of communal land by the 
entire community, households and persons in general; (g) the sale, donation, lease, 
encumbrance or any alienation of rights to communal land; (h) the use of communal 
land by persons or legal entities other than those  from the relevant community; (i) 
administration fees; (j) such matters as may be prescribed; and (k) any other matter 
the community deem necessary to regulate. 
 
Id. 
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 The Minister may establish communal land boards with jurisdiction 
over larger areas, subject to their discretion.157 These boards would serve 
primarily administrative functions, helping the Minister to implement the 
Act and the communities to manage their land.158 The land boards also 
have the potential to assist in dispute resolution, though it is unclear in 
what capacity.159 
 The Bill proposes a system of dispute resolution in which parties first 
attempt to informally resolve the dispute between themselves.160 If this 
fails, either party may refer the matter to the traditional council, communal 
property association, or Households Forum.161 If this fails as well, the 
dispute goes to an independent mediator appointed by the Director-
General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform.162 In 
the event that mediation is unsuccessful, the Minister must designate either 
an official from within the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform as adjudicator, or appoint an adjudication committee of three 
individuals, to resolve the dispute.163 The outcome of adjudication is 
appealable by either party to the courts.164 The Bill relies heavily on the 
capacity of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. 
Several concerns have been raised about whether this is feasible.165 
 The CLTB concluded its public comment period in November 2017 
and has been heralded by some as a significant step in the direction of 
meaningful land reform and an important catalyst for economic security 
for the rural poor.166 However, other voices have criticized the proposed 
 
157. Id. § 36. 
158. Id. § 39. 
159. Id. § 39(e). 
160.  Id. § 45(1). 
161.  Id. § 45(2). 
162.  Id. § 45(3). 
163.  Id. § 45(4). 
164.  Id. § 45(5). 
165. William Beinart, Africa: Comments on the Communal Land Tenure Bill, 2017, ALL AFRICA 
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://allafrica.com/stories/201708160467.html. 
166. Theo Boshoff, Land Bill is a Good, if Flawed, Start, MAIL & GUARDIAN (July 14, 2017), 
https://mg.co.za/article/2201-07-14-00-land-bill-is-a-good-if-flawed-start, stating: 
 
The draft Bill finally opted for the transfer of ownership rights. It makes provision for the 
minister to transfer ownership of the land a community resides on to the community. The 
community can choose whether they want a Communal Property Institution (CPA), a 
traditional council or any other body approved by the minister to administer the land. 
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legislation for consolidating control over land in the hands of traditional 
leadership.167 They worry that it will actually uproot millions of people 
living on communal land, exacerbating the very problem it is meant to 
ameliorate.168 Some have suggested that the real impetus behind the CLTB 
is an attempt to rally traditional leadership behind the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC) party.169 
 
B. The Land Records Act 
 
The Land Records Act (LRA) is a statutory prototype proposed under 
the auspices of Good Governance Africa,170 a non-profit organization 
dedicated to research and advocacy focused on improving governance 
across the continent.171 The LRA would entail a statutory recording 
(recordal) of all rights not already registered in the formal Deeds 
Registry.172 This would include informal land rights, as well as freehold 
 
Although the land in its entirety is transferred to the community, they can decide 
internally what legal form individual allocations to members will take, namely leasehold, 
use rights or full ownership. 
From an agribusiness point of view, this is a huge step towards creating an enabling 
environment in those areas to develop commercial agricultural and associated enterprises. 
If ownership is transferred, community members can decide to use their land as collateral 
to obtain the financing needed to build infrastructure and buy the inputs to run a 
commercial farming operation. 
167. New Land Bill Likely to Uproot Over 17 million People: Report BUSINESSTECH, 
https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/191934/new-land-bill-likely-to-uproot-over-17-million-
people-report/,(last visited Mar. 9, 2019),  explaining: 
 
Dr Aninka Claassens of the Land and Accountability Research Centre noted that 
traditional leaders still hold much of the power in the latest revision, and individuals 
could now only acquire a deed or title if given permission by a leader. 
This extends to communities of over 100,000 people who will lose their rights to land 
when the bill transfers their individual ownership of land to the broader “community”. 
 
168. Id. (“DA MP Kevin Mileham said the law was a move by government to rally traditional 
leadership around the ANC.”). 
169. Id. 
170. Kingwell, supra note 31. 
171. Who We Are, GOOD GOVERNANCE AFRICA, https://www.gga.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 
3, 2018). 
172. Kingwell, supra note 31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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and quitrent title which have fallen out of step with the Deeds Registry.173 
The processes of clarifying rights through recordal would involve 
several interlocking processes. The first stage of enumeration and recordal 
of existing, unadjudicated rights could be done alongside a census. The 
second stage of adjudication of rights according to new forms of 
admissible evidence, including ‘living law’ and customary law norms, 
should culminate in recordal in a repository of certified rights, with the 
issuing of a certificate of a land right showing an adjudicated, legal land 
right that can stand up as evidence in a court of law.174 
 
 The LRA would also establish an institution for resolving disputes 
where rights are overlapping or contested; an office to award new land 
rights; an independent public protector to hold government to account and 
enforce compliance; and a surveying entity which would mirror the 
existing Surveyor General for the spatial measurement of land in terms of 
the LRA but relying on modern, visual technology and mapping instead of 
expensive, traditional surveying techniques.175 This last institution would 
exist side-by-side with the Surveyor General, creating a parallel system of 
visual demarcation which, while not meeting the mathematical precision 
required by more traditional surveying, would produce adequate results at 
a significantly lower cost.176 The LRA would provide for this parallelism 
and allow for progressive changes over time.177 Disputes would only be 
appealable to the courts if they could not be solved by the institution 
created by the LRA for dispute resolution.178 
 The proponents of the LRA argue that it would develop strong rights 
for off-register landholders, which they estimate constitute sixty percent of 
South Africa’s population.179 It is designed to protect rights at the level of 
the family, either individually or collectively, and to avoid conflating the 









180. Id. Recent evidence was provided by the public hearings of the High Level Panels in 2017, 
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Moreover, the proponents insist that the LRA would be relatively 
inexpensive for the state to operate, as it is a re-engineering exercise rather 
than the creation of a large new bureaucracy.181   
 
 
C. The Namibian Flexible Land Tenure Model: An International 
Perspective 
 
South Africa’s struggle to remedy tenure insecurity is not unique; 
neighboring Namibia has been working to develop a lasting legislative 
solution to its own similar socio-political reality since the early 1990s.182 
The first and most obvious solution was simply to extend the existing 
freehold system, already applicable to about half of the country, 
everywhere.183 However, this avenue was hindered by, among other 
things, a shortage of skills in the private and public sectors required to 
navigate the complexities of formal surveying, titling, and conveyancing; a 
lack of regular income; and the requirements of various existing pieces of 
legislation.184  
Thus a second system was devised to exist parallel to, and 
interchangeably with, the established freehold system.185 This system, 
initially labelled the Flexible Land Tenure Project, would create two new 
forms of tenure: starter title and landhold title.186 Starter title would be a 
statutory form of tenure registered in respect of a block of land while 
landhold title, while also statutory, would confer the “most important 
aspects of freehold ownership but without the complications of full 
 
which heard a wide range of testimony on the insecurity of rights in former communal areas. Id. In the 
Eastern Cape witnesses spoke of the complete breakdown in land administration and allocation 
systems contributing to arbitrary changes in land use, often to the detriment of women’s rights in land. 
Id. In Mpumalanga one community member testified that “[P]eople continue to suffer because the land 
is sold . . .. Communal land belongs to the people, it is not tribal land. It is common here in 
Mpumalanga where I live that traditional leaders sell land to foreigners.” Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Søren Fauerholm Christensen, Flexible Land Tenure in Namibia: Offering Registration to 
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freehold.”187 One of the principal distinctions between the two proposed 
forms of tenure is that starter title, while registered in the name of an 
individual (as a custodian for the entire household) is a group-based right 
in that each household within the block parcel must abide by rule of the 
community laid down by a community association.188 
This system was tested in a pilot program from 1995-1996, which 
focused on addressing practical land surveying and related planning 
issues.189 The accuracy of different survey methods was ascertained, along 
with the time they would consume, the cost of materials, and the skills 
demanded.190 Though the government lent its support to the project in 
1997, the lack of official resources delayed translating it into actual 
legislation.191 Over a decade and a half after political support for the 
project was secured, Namibia’s Parliament enacted the Flexible Land 
Tenure Act (FLTA) in June of 2012.192 
The FLTA starts by creating a unit of land management called the 
“blockerf,” which means simply any piece of land to which the starter title 
or landhold title scheme is applied.193 Starter title gives the holder the right 
to erect a dwelling at a specified location within the blockerf, though it 
does not define any plot or parcel surrounding the dwelling.194 It does, 
however, provide that the size and nature of the dwelling will be 
specified.195 Starter title confers the right to occupy the dwelling in 
perpetuity and is inheritable, alienable, and transferable.196 It also confers 
the right to utilize whatever services are provided to the blockerf as a 
whole, and to be a member of the relevant community association.197 
Landhold title, unlike starter title, grants the holder full ownership rights 







192. Flexible Land Tenure Act of 2012 (Namib.). 
193. Id. § 1. 
194. Id. § 9(1)(a). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. § 9(1). 
197. Id.  
198. Id. § 10. 
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law land owner, but landhold title holders also possess an undivided 
interest in the communal property of the blockerf (all of the property not 
allotted in terms of landhold or starter title).199 The FLTA requires both 





In analyzing the various legislative approaches to securing tenure, and 
the theoretical bases upon which they rest, the minimum constitutional 
standards established by the Constitutional Court in Tongoane, Alexkor, 
and Pilane comprise the sounding board against which all theories will be 
tested. From Tongoane we know that tenure insecurity is the result of a 
history in which Africans were systematically dispossessed of land and 
relocated,201 granted conditional title to what land they were allocated,202 
and tolerated in “white” South Africa only to the extent they provided a 
necessary labor force.203 As it is the purpose of the Property Clause204 to 
reverse this trend,205 we can put forward the minimum standard of tenure 
 
199. Id. 
200. Id. § 6. 
201. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 25 (“The forced removals of African people from the land which 
they occupied to the limited amount of land reserved for them by the apartheid state resulted in the 
majority of African people being dispossessed of their land. It also left a majority of them without 
legally secure tenure in land”). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. ¶ 26 explaining: 
 
The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 197056 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution 
Act, 197157 further entrenched land dispossession as a key policy of the apartheid 
edifice. African people would, as a consequence, have no claim to any land in “white” 
South Africa. African people were tolerated in “white” South Africa only to the extent 
that they were needed to provide labour to run the economy. They had precarious title to 
the land they occupied to remind them of the impermanence of their residence in “white” 
South Africa. 
 
204. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 25(6), 25(9). 
205. Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 ¶ 28 describing that: 
 
One of the goals of our Constitution is to reverse all of this. It requires the restoration of 
land to people and communities that were dispossessed of land by colonial and apartheid 
laws after 19 June 1913. It also requires that people and communities whose tenure of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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security as a system in which Africans are systematically granted access to 
and rights in land, where title is not conditioned along racial lines, and 
where the total impact is to encourage racial equality and economic 
empowerment. It is important to note the inextricable relationship between 
racial oppression and economic predation,206 which is one of such 
intimacy that some have argued it is impossible to even speak about land 
in South Africa without speaking about race.207 Modern tenure insecurity, 
as described by the Tongoane court, is the product of a calculated effort to 
undermine black South African economic independence and create a 
“floating, landless proletariat whose labour could be used and manipulated 
at will.”208 Therefore, it is vital to consider the economic implications of 
 
land is legally insecure as a result of racially discriminatory colonial and apartheid laws 
be provided with legally secure tenure or comparable redress. 
 
206. See, eg., Ben Cousins, The EFF’s Land Policies: A Leap in the Dark, DAILY MAVERICK (11 
July 2016), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-07-11-the-effs-land-policies-a-leap-in-
the-dark/#.Wna5LainGCg, stating that:  
 
If the nature of the South African economy in general, and of the agricultural economy in 
particular, cannot be understood without consideration of racial oppression, then it is 
equally true to say that racial inequality cannot be understood apart from the class 
dynamics of capitalism. These two dynamics are inextricably intertwined, and in South 
Africa tend to “co-produce” each other. For most black South Africans, race and class 
location taken together ensure that they are at the bottom of the social pile. For most 
women, an added disadvantage is unequal gendered relations – the notorious “triple 
burden.”  
 
207. Lubabalo Ntsholo, South Africa Can’t Speak about Land Without Speaking about Race, DAILY 
MAVERICK (20 June 2016), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-20-south-africa-
cant-speak-about-land-without-speaking-about-race/#.Wna5a6inHb0, claiming: 
 
The narratives on land in South Africa would have us believe that the central problem 
relating to the land and agrarian question is that relating to the reorganisation of the 
economy in the countryside, and is less to do with race as both a historical and present 
determinant to access social and economic power, and the centrality of race-based land 
ownership as a facilitator of inequality. Valid as the argument for agrarian reform may 
be, it is archaic, treacherous and void of honesty if at the same time it does not deal with 
the primacy of redress for historical land dispossession as a necessary precursor for 
comprehensive agrarian reform. The evolution of the land question in this country has 
been along a very peculiar, racial path; a path unparalleled even by other African 
experiences of land alienation. Therefore, arguments that seek to relegate race as a key 
determinant on the discourse on land are dishonest intellectual posturing. 
 
208. PLAATJE, supra note 36, (Foreword by Bessie Head). 
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any proposal to secure tenure. 
 
A. Individual Titling is Constitutionally Inadequate to Secure Tenure 
 
Some of the most vociferous proponents of individual titling argue that 
it provides unparalleled economic security and incentivizes the most 
efficient and productive use of land.209 These same proponents like to 
point out that individual tenure provides solid collateral for a loan, and 
thus increases the landholders access to capital and economic wellbeing. 
Some researchers have disputed the validity of these theories, indicating 
that certain communities did not experience the projected investment and 
development upon obtaining title.210 However, for our purposes it is not 
necessary to debate the economics of individual versus communal title. It 
is enough to recognize that the Alexkor holding demands the formal legal 
system respect communal title derived from principles of indigenous 
law.211 The nature and content of these rights must be determined by the 
standards of indigenous law, not viewed through the distorting prism of 
common law.212 Arbitrarily imposing individual title across areas subject 
to informal systems of communal tenure would be to deprive communities 
of indigenous title, amounting in an expropriation of land which would 
require compensation in order to be constitutional.213  
 
209. Shackelford, supra note 136 (citing Karol C. Boudreaux, The Legal Empowerment of the Poor: 
Titling and Poverty Alleviation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 
309, 314 (2008)). 
210. COUSINS ET AL., supra note 104. 
211. Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 62. The Court states: 
 
In the light of the evidence and of the findings by the SCA and the LCC, we are of the view 
that the real character of the title that the Richtersveld Community possessed in the subject 
land was a right of communal ownership under indigenous law. The content of that right 
included the right to exclusive occupation and use of the subject land by members of the 
Community. The Community had the right to use its water, to use its land for grazing and 
hunting and to exploit its natural resources, above and beneath the surface.  It follows 
therefore that prior to annexation the Richtersveld Community had a right of ownership in 
the subject land under indigenous law”). 
Id. 
212. Id. ¶ 50 (“The nature and the content of the rights that the Richtersveld Community held in the 
subject land prior to annexation must be determined by reference to indigenous law.  That is the law 
which governed its land rights. Those rights cannot be determined by reference to common law.”).  
213. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 25(2)(b). This holding will be complicated by the potential 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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More fundamentally, individual titling would demand a massive 
assertion of state resources and power, with the affect that many people 
who currently live on communal land or possess informal rights of use and 
access would be forced to relocate or be deprived of the benefits which 
their communal status affords them. This smacks all-too closely of the 
oppressive apartheid practices which efforts to secure tenure must reverse. 
Legislation to secure tenure may provide a pathway by which 
communities can elect individual titling, but to impose it from above is to 
perpetuate the fundamental violence of apartheid land policy and to 
contravene the explicit requirements provided by the Constitutional Court 
in Tongoane and Alexkor.   
One criticism of the Namibian Flexible Land Tenure Act is that it seems 
to implicitly view starter and landhold title as steps on the ladder to 
individual title, necessary more because of a lack of governmental 
capacity than for their desirability in themselves. If we are to take 
seriously the vision of the future in which “indigenous law feeds into, 
nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam of South African 
law,”214 we must resist viewing communal property as an inconvenience to 
be discouraged, and instead consider what it would mean for it to be an 
integral and vibrant part of the South African landscape. Moreover, 
decades of research by experts such as Donna Hornby, Rosalie Kingwill, 
Lauren Royston, Ben Cousins, Aninka Claasens (among many others) 
indicates that the web of reciprocal rights and obligations that constitutes 
the basis of communal title215 has provided baseline tenure security for 
many South Africans,216 despite the fact that most conventional property 
 
constitutional amendment allowing expropriation without compensation. See, e.g., Ed Stoddard, 
Explainer: South Africa Aims to Expropriate Land Without Compensation, REUTERS (March 4, 2018, 
10:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-land-explainer/explainer-south-africa-aims-to-
expropriate-land-without-compensation-idUSKCN1GQ280. 
214. Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 51. 
215. For a review of reciprocal and nested nature of communal land rights see, e.g., Hornby et al., 
supra note 33, at 139-145; Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 73, at 96-97. 
216. Ben Cousins, Characterising ‘Communal’ Tenure: Nested Systems and Flexible Boundaries, in 
LAND, POWER & CUSTOM 109, 118 (Claasens & Cousins eds., 2008) (“Contemporary case studies 
suggest that many occupants of communal land enjoy de facto tenure security. This is because existing 
systems, many of them now informal in character, work reasonably well on a day-to-day basis.)”; 
Affidavit for Benjamin Cousins ¶ 59-61, Tongoane and Others v. Minister for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs and Others 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC). 
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law either ignores it or actively subverts it.217 This indicates that 
communal title may be rightly viewed as an end in its own right, for 
pragmatic as well as constitutional reasons. 
 
B. Indigenous Title Vests at the Community Level 
 
There has been significant disagreement over whether traditional leaders 
own communal land, with the members of the community possessing 
rights of use and occupation under the auspices of the traditional 
leadership, or whether title vests in the community as a whole. 
Researchers such as Ben Cousins, Lauren Royston, Donna Hornby, and 
Rosalie Kingwill have argued for the latter,218 pointing to evidence that 
control of land is vested at different levels of the social organization 
depending on the resource in question, which has been labelled the 
“nested” quality of communal property under indigenous law.219 
Proponents of the alternative viewpoint, Samuel Khunou in particular, 
disagree and say that the traditional leaders are the owners of the land, 
though the community members have rights which protect their interests 
in communal land of which they cannot be arbitrarily deprived.220 
From a purely semantic perspective, it is difficult to distinguish the 
significance of the two viewpoints. In order to actually understand what 
the theoretical differences entail, it is useful to see how they have inspired 
concrete policy agendas. As implemented in legislation, namely the CLTB 
and its predecessor CLARA, the latter viewpoint—which has principally 
set the policy-making status-quo—has defined community in such a way 
 
217. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 73, at 96-97. 
218. KINGWELL ET AL., supra note 33. 
219. Id. See also, Affidavit for Benjamin Cousins ¶¶ 67-68 in Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 (“The 
rights are layered within one another, and extend upward from the household through the family 
group, the neighbourhood, the village, and the ward, to the chieftancy, depending on the resources in 
question… a key feature of indigenous tenure regimes is that access to land and control over land do 
not coincide, as they do in the common law construct of ownership.”). 
220. Affidavit of Samuel Freddy Khunou ¶ 18.5 in Tongoane, 2010 (6) SA 214 (“[M]any people 
interviewed in Mayaeyane did not regard themselves as the legitimate “owners” of land in Mayaeyane. 
Instead, they recognized the kgosi and the headman as the “owners” of the land who served their 
interests.”); Id. ¶ 20.6 (“[T]he people of Mayaeyane could not dispose of the land or sell it. However, it 
was important to note that no one (including the kgosi) could arbitrarily deprive them of the use of the 
land.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/18
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as to make it completely subject to the traditional leadership and thus 
undermining decision-making authority and land administration at the 
level of the household, clan, and village in favor of that at the very top of 
the traditional hierarchy.221 This is at odds both with the findings of many 
researchers, and the language of the Constitutional Court. In Alexkor the 
Court found indigenous title vested in the community without ever 
mentioning traditional leaders.222 There have been reports that some 
traditional leaders, believing they legally own communal land, have begun 
attempting to charge individuals for their occupancy.223 Others have 
entered into mining deals with private companies without consulting 
impacted communities.224 Rather than facilitate security of tenure for 
individuals in those areas, this trend actually destabilizes it and runs 
counter to the constitutional mandate. 
 
C. The Content & Character of Communal Property Rights Are 
Empirical Matters 
 
A problematic predicate to the idea of communal tenure reform is the 
fact that the very definition of ‘community’ is open for debate. The CLTB 
adopts a definition of community inherited from apartheid era 
legislation.225 The idea that tenure insecurity could be remedied by 
referencing the very legislation that created it in the first place is almost 
facially absurd.226 In addition to its historical and anthropological failings, 
such a definition of community is untenable from a practical 
 
221. LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, INVITATION TO COMMENT ON THE COMMUNAL LAND TENURE 
BILL 2017, ¶¶ 2.18.1, 3.1.1 (2017). 
222. See id. ¶ 2.8. 
223. See, e.g., Thiyane Duda, Op-Ed: Communal Land Belongs to the People, Not to the Chiefs, 
DAILY MAVERICK (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-05-op-ed-
communal-land-belongs-to-the-people-not-to-the-chiefs/#.WmT55ahKuCg. The author received 
similar reports first-hand while interning for the Legal Resources Centre in Durban, South Africa.  
224. Id. See also Aninka Claasens, South Africa’s Mining Boom: Double Dispossession for the Rural 
Poor, LAND & ACCOUNTABILITY RESEARCH CENTRE (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.customcontested.co.za/south-africas-mining-boom-double-dispossession-rural-poor/. 
225. LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, supra note 221, ¶ 4.15 (“The central problem is that the draft Bill 
works with the community definition of the Framework Act, thus communities are exclusively defined 
as groupings under a senior traditional leader.”). 
226. See id. 
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perspective.227 Some of these communities could number in the hundreds 
of thousands, large enough to make the vision of flexible shared property 
arrangements unlikely to be realized.228 Experts have pointed out that, if 
community is defined in such a way, one such community will likely 
contain several different de facto tenure arrangements, which will make 
uniform democratic decision-making very difficult.229 
The Namibian Flexible Land Tenure Act avoids this problem by 
approaching each blockerf individually and examining the feasibility of 
implementing a starter or landhold title scheme based on the situation of 
the land in question.230 Such a system is more in line with the vision of 
living customary law set out in Alexkor than the rigid, top-down version of 
community detailed by the CLTB. Any system purporting to establish 
tenure security and incorporate customary law must be sensitive to the 
actual practices of the community and its historical situation.231 
Keeping this principle firmly in mind, policymakers must resist the 
temptation of delineating strict substantive property rights a priori, as 
doing so may infringe on the actual practices of any given community and 
thus raise the spectre of constitutional challenge. One of the key 
challenges to the CLTB is that it artificially concentrates authority in the 
hands of a centralized elite, contrary to the actual nested nature of many 
off-register tenure models.232 If a statutory tenure model is to be successful 
it must focus on the process by which land is to be surveyed, communities 
defined, and disputes resolved in accordance with actual practices. It 
cannot impose a single theoretical or idealized vision from on high, at least 
not without violating the Constitution. The idea of a recordal of off-
register rights, as proposed by the LRA, is just such a procedural 
mechanism which uses legislation to legitimize and secure rights in the 
spirit of constitutional caselaw like Alexkor.233 
 
 
227. Id. ¶ 4.16. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. ¶¶ 4.17-.18. 
230. See Flexible Land Tenure Act 4 of 2012, § 11 (Namib.). 
231.  See Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 57. 
232. See LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, supra note 221, ¶ 4.18. 
233. Kingwell, supra note 31. 
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D.	Property Rights Are Only as Good as the Institutions Which Protect 
Them 
 
Floating in the background of any effort to realize secure communal 
tenure is the intimately connected issue of community decision-making 
and authority. In Namibia, this problem was dealt with by creating 
associations, managed by committee, and comprised of all starter and 
landhold title holders in a scheme.234 This is not dissimilar in principle to 
the management structure envisioned by the CLTB, which vests authority 
in a Traditional Council or a Communal Property Association. Communal 
Property Associations (CPAs) are enabled by the Communal Property 
Associations Act,235 and have garnered harsh criticism for inadequately 
addressing the purposes for which they were created.236 Part of the 
dysfunction stems from the lack of governmental support for CPAs.237 
Clearly, whatever association is used to direct communal land 
management must be adequately supported, trained, and financed, 
otherwise the most well-intentioned legislation will flounder for lack of 
capacity. 
Not only have the organizations tasked with administering and 
managing communal land not been given adequate support, but the 
government itself has been seriously overtaxed by existing titling 
efforts.238 There are concerns that the CLTB will exceed the government’s 
capacity due to the massive burden it places on the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform239 in a country where the economic 
outlook is already grim.240 It goes almost without saying that legislation 
purporting to secure tenure must be within the practical limits of 
governmental capacity, or else it is nothing but a paper tiger. As it stands, 
it seems unlikely the CLTB is a realistic piece of legislation, even if it 
 
234. See Flexible Land Tenure Act 4 of 2012, § 18 (Namib.). 
235. Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 (S. Afr.). 
236. See LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, supra note 221, at ANNEXURE A. 
237. Ebrahim, supra note 12. 
238. Beinart, supra note 165. 
239. Id. 
240. Barbara Curson, Is South Africa Heading for a Debt Crisis?, THE CITIZEN (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/is-south-africa-heading-for-a-debt-crisis/. 
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were deemed to be a desirable one.241 One of the advantages of the 
streamlined surveying and titling methodology employed by Namibia’s 
FLTA is that it significantly reduces the costs associated with 
conventional land titling, registering, and conveyancing.242 It makes a 
great deal of sense to utilize Namibia’s research and benefit from the 




The working minimum standards that any proposed legislation to secure 
tenure must meet to comport with the Constitution are: (1) the legislation 
must systematically grant Africans access to and rights in land; (2) it must 
not condition title along racial lines (i.e.–confer a lesser form of title to 
one race than another); and (3) its net effect must be to encourage racial 
equality and economic empowerment. To this end, I propose that future 
legislation further the tenure securing process by prioritizing efficient 
dispute resolution, implementable surveying and rights recording, and a 
robust starter title scheme to provide an immediate level of security at the 
household level. 
The financial capacity of the organs of state tasked with implementing 
whatever legislation is enacted pursuant to these objectives is of 
paramount importance. This means that, in many cases, perfection must be 
sacrificed for practicality. Tenure insecurity is the product of centuries of 
colonial and apartheid exploitation, it will not be reversed overnight. What 
is important is that South African society begin moving in the right 
direction, both in fact and in perception. This legislation should thus be 
viewed as a framework act or planning statute—a skeleton for future 
growth.  
 A cost-effective surveying and rights-recording methodology is vital 
for building the foundation for strong tenure security among those parts of 
South African society whose claim to land has been, for the most part, 
invisible. I propose combining the years of data and expertise developed 
by the Namibian FLTA with the idea of a rights recordal as outlined by the 
 
241.  Beinart, supra note 165. 
242.  Christensen, supra note 182. 
243.  See id. 
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LRA.244 This would likely entail a government entity tasked with using 
modern visual technology and mapping to create a surveying database 
parallel to the traditional surveying system and equal in law, but not 
necessarily requiring the same mathematical precision.245 One of the 
primary objectives of this surveying effort would be to map areas of land 
held and worked in common. ‘Community’ would be defined, not by some 
artificial idea of traditional authority inherited from apartheid legislation 
or developed ex ante by academics but would be derived empirically from 
what is measured and observed during the course of the surveys.  
 At the same time the surveying entity is mapping the contours of 
communal property, it will be issuing starter title to individual households 
pursuant to its findings.246 This will provide an immediately more secure 
claim to the land upon which people are already living, as well as a form 
of documentation cognizable by law and available to be utilized as 
collateral for a loan.247 This theoretical legislation may also want to 
implement a landhold title scheme, similar to the FLTA. However, in the 
name of practicality and the best use of scarce governmental resources, 
this may be something deferred to a later date.  
 I also propose that land disputes be adjudicated through the system of 
Magistrates’ Courts.248 These courts are the most readily accessible to 
rural South Africans, who are most likely to require the adjudication of 
communal land rights claims. Moreover, while in theory it might seem 
attractive to create an elaborate system of dispute resolution especially for 
this sort of claim—as the CLTB proposes doing249—it makes more sense 
to invest scarce resources in augmenting an existing system, with which 
 
244. See Kingwell, supra note 31. 
245. Id.; Christensen, supra note 182. 
246.  For an overview of Namibia’s approach to starter title, see Flexible Land Tenure Act 4 of 2012, 
§ 9 (Namib.). 
247.  One area that is still problematic is the relationship between the individual (usually the head of 
household) and the household itself. See LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, supra note 221, ¶ 4.7.3. The 
LRC in its comments to the CLTB insists that entire households have claim to land. Id. From a 
practical perspective, however, it is difficult to envision a convenient system for granting starter title to 
every member of a household. 
248.  For an overview of the South African Courts’ structure, see Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa, Courts in South Africa, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/about/sa-courts.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Courts in South 
Africa]. 
249. See Communal Land Tenure Bill of 2017 § 45 (S. Afr.). 
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people are already familiar, than to divert them into creating something 
wholly new. However, I also propose that, as suggested by the LRA, 
specific rules of evidence be promulgated around this variety of claim, 
particularly to take account of “living law” and customary law norms.250 A 
specialist appellate court could be created for the express purpose of 
adjudicating tenure related claims originating in Magistrates’ Courts 
around the country.251 Situating tenure dispute resolution within the court 
system has a dual purpose. First, and most obviously, it would provide a 
(mostly) efficient way of achieving final resolution of contested tenure 
arrangements. But second, and just as important, it could be used to 
develop a body of communal-indigenous common law which would give 
effect to the Constitutional Court’s aspirational promise in Alexkor that, in 
modern South Africa, “indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with 
and becomes part of the amalgam of South African law.”252 Rather than 
task a special office with cataloguing and recording indigenous property 
rights, this system would utilize the special genius of all common law 
systems, which is to generate a body of law from the resolution of 
individual disputes.  
 Finally, the above proposals must be augmented by a concerted effort 
to bolster the dysfunctional Community Property Associations Act so that 
communities can establish CPAs to manage and administer commonage. 
Whether this can be done simply through further allocation of resources 
within the existing legislative structure is uncertain. It may require the 
promulgation of new legislation to refine governmental support of CPAs. 
In any case, communal tenure security cannot be achieved if the entities 
designed to be the community’s apparatus for exercising control over its 
land are left derelict and in disrepair. 
 
250. See, e.g., Kingwell, supra note 31. Note that this is not unprecedented, South African Courts 
were first authorized to take judicial notice of indigenous law in 1988 with the passage of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which states that “Any court may take judicial notice of the law 
of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with 
sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public 
policy and natural justice.” Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 1(1) (S.Afr.). 
251. South Africa has several specialist courts already, such as the Land Claims Court, the Special 
Income Tax Courts, and the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts. See Courts in South Africa, supra note 
248. Thus, creating one specifically for the purposes envisioned here would not be unprecedented. See 
id. 
252. Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 51.  
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South Africa desperately needs tenure reform.253 It needs tenure reform 
immediately, and it can more afford imperfection than it can inaction.254 I 
propose that short term gains be made by focusing on (1) policies of quick 
and cost-effective surveying, (2) accessible dispute resolution to 
simultaneously resolve contested land rights and build a body of law 
around communal property mores, (3) a starter title scheme to provide a 
modicum of security to those whose tenure is most tenuous, and (4) 
systematic investment in CPAs and local governance organizations. These 
will stabilize the management of communal property, begin the process of 
formalizing off-register land rights, provide economic security and 
liquidity to those living and working on land to which they have no 
documentation at present, and provide a mechanism for the vindication of 
indigenous property rights in court. Not only will this begin the process of 
securing tenure for millions of South Africans, it will do so in a way that 
attempts to fuse indigenous and common law concepts according to the 
vision of the Constitutional Court.255  
 
 
253.  Ebrahim, supra note 12 (“If we do not see meaningful change within the next 10 to 15 years, the 
majority of the population, which does not have access to land, might grow tired of waiting and might 
then take the law into their own hands.”). 
254. The populist rhetoric among certain quarters advocating for the forcible repatriation of white-
owned land by black South Africans is testament to this. See, e.g., Macharia, supra note 14. 
255. Alexkor, 2004 (5) SA 460 ¶ 51. 
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